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INTRODUCTION
By any standard George Soros is an impressive person. Not only is he one of the
world’s most successful financiers, making him one of the world’s richest men, he is
also one of the world’s leading philanthropists, having given away hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars in the cause of promoting democracy, human rights, and open society.
This financial success and philanthropic generosity would be enough to mark him as
an exceptional individual, but on top of this Soros has become a leading public intellec-
tual engaged with vital questions concerning financial markets, economic development,
and globalization.
 Soros’ views on financial markets are complex and at odds with most of the eco-
nomics profession, marking him as an intellectual iconoclast. Especially important is
the fact that his theoretical iconoclasm extends to the realm of policy, where he has
continually engaged in a search for new and better policies. In doing so, Soros joins
iconoclastic intellectualism with the real world pragmatism of a financier.
This paper explores George Soros’ thinking about financial markets, with special
emphasis on his views regarding the shortcomings of the current international finan-
cial system and its treatment of developing countries. The paper distinguishes among
Soros as financial market theorist, Soros as political economist, and Soros as analyst
of the current international financial system. Regarding Soros’ theorizing about finan-
cial markets, the paper identifies a robust connection to the post-Keynesian tradition
in economics. His thinking on developing countries and the international financial
system is represented in terms of a model of multiple equilibria. The model is then
applied to analyze Brazil’s current financial problems, and policies for escaping the
current “bad” high interest rate equilibrium are explored. At the policy level, Soros’
thinking makes two important contributions. First, it offers important insights into
how to remedy the immediate financial predicament afflicting developing countries
such as Brazil. Second, it challenges neo-liberal thinking about financial markets and
what constitutes appropriate regulation. As such, it can provide the intellectual justi-
fication for selective forms of capital controls.408 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
SOROS AS FINANCIAL MARKET THEORIST
At a meta-theoretical level, Soros’ view of capital markets is captured in his theory
of reflexivity, developed in The Alchemy of Finance [1987].1 This theory represents a
head-on critique of the economics profession’s “market fundamentalism” approach to
capital markets, which maintains that asset prices are determined by economic funda-
mentals as embodied in market supply and demand schedules. In sharp contrast,
Soros questions the existence of exogenous market fundamentals, and in doing so
brings into question the notion of fundamentals-driven equilibrium, which is the core
of mainstream financial markets theory.2 Within Soros’ schema, equilibrium is an
inappropriate concept for financial markets since agents in these markets seek to
discount a future that is itself contingent on how it is discounted. Not only do market
participants have to anticipate a future that is intrinsically unknowable, but their
very actions change the future while their own understandings are changed by that
changing future.
This reflexive construction of financial markets has clear links back to Keynes’
[1936] description of the operation of stock markets in The General Theory. At the
theoretical level, Keynes questioned the relevance of probability in a world character-
ized by risk, arguing that strict objective probabilistic reasoning cannot apply “since
our existing knowledge does not provide a sufficient basis for a calculated mathemati-
cal expectation” [1936, 152]. To this negative critique, Keynes added important behav-
ioral insights regarding investing being akin to a “game of Snap, of Old Maid, of Musi-
cal Chairs—a pastime in which he is victor who says Snap neither too soon nor too
late, who passes the Old Maid to his neighbour before the game is over, who secures
a chair for himself when the music stops” [1936, 155-56]. This description of investing
is further complicated by the fact that market participants condition their actions on
conjectures about what others are thinking. Thus, Keynes writes
(P)rofessional investment may be likened to those newspaper compe-
titions in which the competitors have to pick out the six prettiest faces
from a hundred photographs, the prize being awarded to the competi-
tor whose choice most nearly corresponds to the average preferences
of the competitors as a whole; so that each competitor has to pick, not
those faces which he himself finds prettiest, but those which he thinks
likeliest to catch the fancy of the other competitors, all of whom are
looking at the problem from the same point of view. It is not a case of
choosing those which, to the best of one’s judgment, are really the
prettiest, nor even those which average opinion genuinely thinks the
prettiest. We have reached the third degree where we devote our
intelligences to anticipating what average opinion expects the aver-
age opinion to be [1936, 156].
These Keynesian behavioral constructions of capital market behavior are clearly
consistent with Soros’ theoretical interpretation. Soros takes these insights a step
deeper, however, by dynamizing them and placing them in a framework that allows
for feedback, making the future conditional on the actions of the present. Elsewhere409 SOROS ON INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS
[Palley, 1993] I have described a post-Keynesian theory of reflexive rational expecta-
tions, in which agents have rational expectations in the sense that their expectations
and behaviors are guided by their understandings (what economists call a model) of
the world. But that is where the parallel with mainstream rational expectations theory
ends, because agents have differing views of the world and these views are constantly
changing in light of their experiences. Nor is there any question of agents’ converging
on a common view, as suggested by mainstream economists’ descriptions of rational
expectations with learning. Such convergence is at odds with everything we know
about human nature and society, and it would certainly never occur in an open soci-
ety. All these features are either directly present or implied in Soros’ view of financial
markets and, when added to his Keynesian instincts regarding the causes of and cures
for economic recession, they make George Soros a post-Keynesian thinker.
SOROS AS POLITICAL ECONOMIST
The above theoretical construction of financial markets is joined with deep politi-
cal and moral insights, and this has contributed to Soros’ standing as a public intellec-
tual. For Soros, market fundamentalism is not only a false theory, but it is also a
dangerous one.3 It is false because it profoundly misapprehends the way financial
markets operate by assuming that markets tend toward a fundamentals-determined
equilibrium. It is dangerous because it mistakenly endows the pursuit of self-interest
with a moral quality by assuming an identity of private and public interests. In fact,
moral considerations find no expression in market prices because anonymous market
participants reason that they need not be overly concerned with the social conse-
quences of their actions as these actions are so marginal in terms of the overall mar-
ket. Moreover, even if some choose to step out of the market process for moral rea-
sons, their place is quickly taken by others who are less scrupulous.
The amorality of markets has important policy implications, as it opens a justifica-
tion for public policy interventions. Thus, Soros [2002b] writes: “It is exactly because
markets are amoral that we cannot leave the allocation of resources entirely to them.
Society cannot hold together without some consideration of the common interest. If
private interests cannot be equated with the public interest, the public interest must
be given expression in some other way than through the market.” The upshot is that
society must develop means of ensuring that both private and public interests are
served by the market process.
Recognizing the shortcomings of markets does not mean an abandonment of mar-
kets, however. Instead, it points to the need for regulation that provides boundaries
on markets and market behavior. In making this observation, Soros also recognizes
the dangers and limits of regulation, which must be nested in a system that allows for
regulations to be updated and modified in response to changing understandings: “To
be sure, in developing a new regulatory framework we must remember that regula-
tions are liable to be even more imperfect than markets. They need a feedback mecha-
nism that allows mistakes to be corrected. That is what makes regulated markets
superior to central planning. In the absence of feedback either from markets or from
free speech and free elections, there is no limit to how far governments can go wrong.410 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
But democracy can keep the excesses of government within bounds, just as govern-
ment can contain the excesses of the financial markets” [Soros, 2002b].
It is this need for feedback that makes open society so critical for markets. Left to
their own devices, markets risk going to socially disruptive extremes.4 Yet, market
regulation in a closed society will destroy the creative and beneficial energy of mar-
kets, rendering regulation as imperfect as markets. Open society in the form of democ-
racy, free speech, and freedom of association is therefore needed to keep the excesses
of government within bounds, just as government must contain the excesses of the
financial markets. This capacity for regulatory feedback is what makes democratic
regulated markets economically superior to authoritarian central planning. This func-
tional contribution of open society also makes it both a means and an end—a means
for harvesting the benefits of markets and a desired end of civil society in its own
right. In this regard, the concept of open society has similarities with Nobel laureate
economist Amartya Sen’s [1999] conception of freedom as means and end of development.
The above construction of the political economy of markets is completed by adding
a role for individuals that embodies a distinction between “rule making” and “playing
by the rules.” As market participants, individuals are allowed to pursue their own self-
interest, but only as long as they play by the rules. However, individuals in an open
society also have a role to play as rule makers. In a democracy, all citizens are rule
makers, and as rule makers they should be guided by the common interest.
There is an elegant architecture to this political economy, but it does mean that
market economies are inevitably politicized. This in turn links to a problem that has
increasingly concerned Soros, and that is the possibility that markets might twist the
democratic process. This problem was visible in Brazil’s last presidential election, in
which the winning candidate, Lula da Silva, was disliked by financial investors. The
threat of financial capital—both foreign and domestic—fleeing Brazil and triggering
an economic crisis raised the prospect that financial markets might prejudice the
election by intimidating voters into voting for the candidate preferred by investors.5
Such a possibility represents a serious threat to open society that troubles Soros, who
has written in connection with Brazil’s election “(i)f financial markets take precedence
over the democratic process, there is something wrong with the system” [Soros, 2002c].
Even with the election over, the new Brazilian government remains significantly
constrained by financial markets regarding the policies it can pursue. In effect, Brazil
has brought into sharp focus the fact that the structure of market regimes has politi-
cal feedbacks. Not only does democratic government regulate markets, but markets
also regulate democratic government. This feature means that policy makers should
not only focus on policy within a given regime structure, but should also focus on
design of the structure itself [Palley, 2001]. It is also why International Monetary
Fund (IMF) structural adjustment programs are so contentious, since they intention-
ally aim to change country economic structures in ways that change the policy space
in potentially antipluralistic and antidemocratic directions [Grabel, 2000]. These issues
and tensions have been largely denied for the last twenty years—the period of the
Washington consensus. But with Brazil having elected a government that espouses a
significantly different social philosophy from its recent predecessor governments, they
can be expected to have greater political salience in the coming years.411 SOROS ON INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS
SOROS ON THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
One aspect of the international financial system is the manner in which it
constrains countries’ abilities to pursue alternative domestic economic policies. A sec-
ond aspect is the extent to which it delivers stable fairly priced flows of capital to
developing country economies. On this latter point Soros is clear: the system is bro-
ken. “The international financial system is failing in the sense that it does not provide
an adequate flow of capital to countries that need it and qualify for it. The markets are
very good at sucking up the savings of the world to the center; but they are failing in
their task of pumping it out to the periphery. This qualifies as news because the
problem is not generally recognized. It is generally believed that financial markets
are very efficient in allocating capital, both domestically and internationally. That is
not the case” [Soros, 2002a, 1].
In a manner reminiscent of 1970s radical dependency theory, Soros uses the lan-
guage of center-periphery relations, and he believes that the current international
financial system dramatically disadvantages periphery (developing) countries. In Soros’
words, “the international financial system is lopsided in favor of the center and to the
detriment of the periphery” [2002a, 2]. This contrasts sharply with the prevailing
conventional wisdom of market discipline, which maintains that countries that play
by the rules and submit to market discipline will be rewarded with steady reasonably
priced flows of capital.
Market fundamentalists believe that all that is needed is for countries to get their
policies right and they will be rewarded by an equilibrium with low interest rates and
plentiful supplies of stable capital. However, at an empirical level the claims of funda-
mentalists have been repeatedly challenged by the string of financial crises that have
afflicted the global economy since the Mexican crisis of 1994. As Nobel laureate econo-
mist Joseph Stiglitz puts it, the world has been enjoying a “boom in busts.” Today,
Argentina and Brazil are the countries currently afflicted by crisis or near-crisis. Argen-
tina faces an economic breakdown more severe than what took place in the United
States during the 1930s. And Brazil is afflicted by a crisis of confidence in capital
markets that has sent its borrowing costs soaring. Both of these countries have played
by the rules. Argentina privatized its state industries and pension system, promoted
labor market reform, lowered tariff barriers and opened its financial markets, prac-
ticed relative fiscal responsibility that was reflected in primary budget surpluses, and
dollarized its currency to guard against inflation.6 Brazil has followed a broadly similar
collection of policies, though it has allowed its currency to float rather than dollarizing.
Yet, in Argentina the result has been economic implosion, while in Brazil the outcome
is still unfolding. Even if Brazil escapes the current crisis, similar problems stand to
resurface in other countries on future occasions.
These failings of the existing system reflect the fact that its construction has been
guided by the principles of market fundamentalism, which assert that financial mar-
kets are governed by stable equilibria. A Keynes-Soros view maintains, however, that
financial markets are inherently unstable. Moreover, within this unstable arrange-
ment, countries on the periphery are especially exposed to crisis. This is because the
system allows free flows of capital but provides no lender of last resort for countries of412 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
the periphery. Since these countries borrow in the hard currencies of the center, they
are subject to the persistent risk of capital flight and currency crisis. This drives up
interest rates, setting the stage for self-fulfilling prophecies regarding imminent bankruptcy.
Not only does this asymmetry expose the periphery countries to persistent risk of
crisis, they are also forced to respond to crises in a manner that amplifies and deepens
the negative domestic economic effects of crises. When economies of the center are
hit by negative economic shocks or when their financial institutions get into trouble,
the monetary and fiscal authorities are able to intervene in a counter-cyclical fashion
that dampens the shock. This is exemplified by the U.S. today, which when confronted
by recession has dramatically lowered interest rates and turned to large budget defi-
cits. Contrastingly, countries at the periphery are unable to take such actions because
they borrow in international markets in foreign currency. When they are hit by nega-
tive shocks, investors flee. This deepens the crisis, and these countries are then com-
pelled to adopt monetary and fiscal austerity to placate financial markets. Though
they can turn to the IMF, the IMF has historically been concerned with preserving
the stability of the international financial system. This means that IMF rescue pro-
grams have tended to be designed so as to enable debtor countries to meet their
obligations rather than fend off recession.
DEBT INSTABILITY WITH MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA: AN APPLICATION TO
BRAZIL
In many regards Brazil serves as a poster child for the failings of the interna-
tional system. Brazil has played by the rules in the sense of running a primary budget
surplus equal to 3.75 percent of GDP and having a conservative anti-inflation-oriented
monetary policy under the direction of a central banker—Arminio Fraga—who has
the support of financial market participants. Despite this, Brazil is subject to capital
flight, and has real interest rates of the order of 20 percent.
A simple model of debt algebra shows that these real interest rates in turn imply
an exploding debt-to-GDP ratio. The growth of the debt-to-GDP ratio is given by
(1) gD/Y = gD – gY ,
where gD/Y = growth of debt to income ratio, gD = growth of debt, and gY = growth of real
GDP. The growth of the debt is given by
(2) gD = i + d/D ,
where i = real interest rate on debt, d = primary budget deficit, and D = national debt.
This can in turn be written as
(3) gD = i + [d/Y]·[Y/D] ,
where d/Y = primary budget deficit as a percent of GDP, and Y/D = GDP to debt ratio.
Substituting Equation (3) in Equation (1) yields
(4) gD/Y = i + [d/Y]·[Y/D] – gY .
For the case of Brazil i = 18 percent, d/Y = –3.75 percent, Y/D = 1.67, and gY  = 3.5
percent. Substituting these values into Equation (4) shows that Brazil’s debt-to-GDP413 SOROS ON INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS
ratio is currently growing at 8.25 percent per annum, which constitutes an explosive
trajectory. If the debt-to-GDP ratio is to be stabilized (that is, gD/Y = 0), the real inter-
est rate must fall to 9.75 percent.
The above simple debt-GDP algebra reveals that Brazil’s problem is one of exces-
sively high interest rates. It has a primary budget surplus, a reasonable real growth
rate, and the debt-to GDP ratio is still within sustainable bounds. The one parameter
that is out of balance is the interest rate, of which Soros writes: “The right question to
ask is what interest rates could be reconciled with reasonable growth. A primary
surplus of 3.75 per cent would be the maximum required, rather than the minimum,
and could support real interest rates of no more than 10 per cent. The challenge would
be how to bring interest rates down to that level” [Soros, 2002c].
Brazil’s interest rate problem can be interpreted through a model of multiple
equilibria, with Brazil now being stuck in the bad equilibrium with high interest rates.
Because interest rates are high, investors expect a greater likelihood of Brazilian
default, and because they hold such expectations they need a high interest rate to
compensate them for bearing the risk of default. In this fashion, expectations sustain
the bad equilibrium. The policy challenge is how to move financial markets from the
“bad” high interest rate equilibrium to the “good” low interest rate equilibrium.
This situation can be modeled as follows. Investors in Brazil need to earn a risk-
adjusted expected return equal to that which they could earn outside, implying the
following condition:
(5) 1 + i* + z = E(R) ,
where i* = foreign interest rate, z = risk premium required for investing in Brazil, and
E(R) = expected return to investments in Brazil. The expected return to Brazilian
investments is given by
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where p(.) = probability of default, X = payment in default state, i = Brazilian real
domestic interest rate, e = real exchange rate. An increase in e represents an appre-
ciation of the Brazilian currency. The probability of default is such that 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, and
the default payment is such that 0 ≤ X ≤ 1. Signs above functional arguments repre-
sent assumed signs of partial derivatives. An increase in the Brazilian domestic inter-
est rate increases the probability of default by increasing the government’s debt ser-
vice burden. An increase in the primary deficit has an ambiguous effect. On one hand
there is a positive Keynesian aggregate demand effect, but on the other hand it adds
to the government’s indebtedness. The primary deficit may also be negatively impacted
by higher interest rates, with the government being forced to cut back spending as
rates rise. The impact of the real exchange rate on the probability of default is ambigu-
ous. On one hand an appreciation reduces the debt burden since much Brazilian debt
is indexed to the dollar, but on the other hand it reduces aggregate demand and
economic activity by reducing net exports. Finally, the impact of the domestic interest
rate on the exchange rate is ambiguous.414 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
The model is closed by adding a dynamic interest rate adjustment mechanism
given by
(7) di/dt = f(1 + i* + z – E(R)) f(0) = 0, f' > 0, f'' > 0
If the return on foreign assets exceeds the risk-adjusted expected return on Brazilian
assets, the Brazilian domestic interest rate rises as agents sell Brazilian assets to buy
foreign assets.
Equation (6), describing the expected return function, is the critical equation of
the model. In Keynes-Soros financial markets, this expected return function is very
unstable. It is also highly nonlinear with respect to the domestic interest rate, and
Figure 1 shows the case in which it partakes of a wave motion. The economic logic of
this nonlinearity is as follows. Initially, a higher domestic interest rate raises the
expected return on Brazilian assets. As interest rates rise, however, the expected
return is pulled down owing to increased bankruptcy risk from higher debt service
burdens. As the interest rate continues to rise, the expected return function may
increase, perhaps because the government is compelled to make budget cuts that
increase the primary surplus. Further rises in the interest rate then bring about a
decline in the expected return, however, as unstable debt dynamics kick in and as
budget cuts to accommodate rising debt service payments generate macroeconomic
recession.
FIGURE 1









E(R), 1 + i
* + z 
Domestic Interest Rate 
There are four equilibria in Figure 1. Equilibrium A is the stable “good” equilib-
rium with low interest rates, Equilibrium B is the unstable low interest rate equilib-
rium, Equilibrium C is the stable “bad” equilibrium with high interest rates, and Equi-
librium D is the unstable high interest rate equilibrium. Brazil, today, can be thought
of as trapped in the bad high interest rate equilibrium given by C or D. The policy
challenge is to move the economy to A.
Figure 2 shows how exogenous shocks originating in the center can negatively
impact the periphery. In Figure 2, the external rate of interest increases, perhaps as
a result of tightening of monetary policy in the U.S. by the Federal Reserve. If the
tightening is sufficiently strong, a developing country could potentially be driven from415 SOROS ON INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS
the good low interest rate equilibrium at A to the bad high interest rate equilibrium at
C. An interesting feature about this is that when rates in the center come down again,
the developing country remains trapped in the bad equilibrium.
FIGURE 2
Effect of a Rise in Foreign Interest Rates
(which can shift the economy from the good to the bad equilibrium)
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This scenario can reasonably be interpreted to apply to Brazil. In 1997, the East
Asian financial crisis caused an increase in the risk premium, z, demanded by global
investors. This in turn shifted up the required rate of return, i* + z, though this shift
was mitigated by the Federal Reserve’s lowering of rates to counter the crisis. Though
the Fed’s actions helped keep the U.S. economic boom going, they also meant that
subsequently in July 1999 the Fed started raising interest rates, thereby driving up
the externally available interest rate, i*. Moreover, throughout this period the U.S.
dollar was appreciating, and since much of Brazil’s domestic debt is indexed to the
dollar, this caused Brazil’s national debt to increase. In effect, dollar appreciation also
served to push the E(R) function down, compounding the effect of investors’ rising
required rate of return.
FINANCIAL POLICIES FOR ADDRESSING THE HIGH INTEREST RATE-
EXTERNAL DEBT PROBLEM
In an economy such as the U.S., the monetary authority can unilaterally lower
interest rates. However, Brazil is a large foreign debtor. Approximately 30 percent of
the public debt is denominated in foreign currency, and a further 30 percent is indexed
to the exchange rate although it is denominated in domestic currency terms. More-
over, the private sector has large foreign currency denominated debts equal to 22.5
percent of GDP.7 These features mean that Brazil needs to maintain the confidence of
international financial markets, since any exchange rate crisis raises the burden of
debt for both the public and private sectors, and generates imported inflation. The
need to placate international financial markets in turn restricts Brazil’s ability unilat-
erally to lower domestic interest rates. Successfully lowering domestic interest rates
requires international capital markets buying into such a situation.416 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
The policy challenge is how to get international capital markets to accept a lower
interest rate. To this end, Soros has suggested two policies. The first is the creation of
some form of guarantee system (perhaps provided by the IMF) that can reduce per-
ceived default risk. “The challenge would be how to bring interest rates down to that
level. That might require some international credit enhancements or guarantees, and
the task would be to find the right instruments that keep the real risks as distinct
from moral hazard within tolerable bounds” [Soros, 2002c]. Figure 3 illustrates the
economic logic behind this solution. Guaranteeing the size of the payment in the
default state is equivalent to increasing the value of X, which shifts up the E(R) func-
tion. If the increase is sufficiently large it can enable escape from the bad equilibrium
at C to the good equilibrium at A.
FIGURE 3
Effect of an Increase in the Default Payment
(which shifts up the E(R) function and can shift the economy
to the good equilibrium)
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Soros’ guarantee proposal has some similarities with that of Lerrick and Meltzer
[2001]. They propose that rather than bailing out countries with emergency loans in
times of crisis, the IMF should set a floor price for country debt and provide countries
with a facility to buy their debt at deeply discounted prices. This would provide sup-
port to bond prices, set a ceiling on interest rates, help retire from the market part of
a country’s debt at below par prices, and give the IMF a secured asset traded on
financial markets rather than the untradable promise of repayment it currently gets.
Lerrick and Meltzer [2001] view their proposal as an alternative means of han-
dling financial crises. In a multiple equilibrium model the same mechanism can be
used to free economies from the pull of a bad equilibrium. Thus, an announced guar-
antee floor price can be thought of as increasing the value of the default state pay-
ment, thereby raising the E(R) function. By simply announcing a guaranteed floor
price for Brazilian bonds, the IMF could potentially free Brazil from the high interest
rate equilibrium in which it is trapped.
A second Soros suggestion is that the central banks of center countries accept
Brazilian government paper at their discount windows [Soros, 2002d, 136]. This would
help correct some of the systemic bias in the system discussed earlier in connection
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it would have the effect of shifting up the E(R) function. The reason is that it would
increase the perceived liquidity of Brazilian paper to international investors since
they would be able to use such paper as collateral at preset prices with center country
central banks.
The prior analysis has identified high interest rates as the cause of Brazil’s finan-
cial crisis, with high interest rates driving a process of unsustainable debt dynamics.
These debt dynamics have also impacted Brazil’s exchange rate dynamics, with un-
sustainable debt leading to capital flight that depreciates the exchange rate. And exchange
rate depreciation in turn generates worsened debt dynamics because a significant
portion of Brazil’s debt is foreign currency denominated or indexed to the dollar.
Recognizing this pattern has important policy implications. First, too much atten-
tion has been focused on the exchange rate, and scarce foreign currency has been
wasted defending it. Exchange rate weakness is a symptom of the problem, not the
cause. The real problem is expectations of default. This suggests that Brazilian authori-
ties should systemically change the focus of their financial market interventions. Defend-
ing the exchange rate should be abandoned. This merely has Brazil exchanging costly
foreign reserves on which it must pay high interest rates for zero-interest-bearing
domestic currency. Instead, Brazil should use its foreign reserves—when the price is
right—to purchase foreign debt. In this case debt can be retired below par, and signifi-
cant interest can be saved.
Recently (first half of 2003), financial sentiment has improved in favor of Brazil,
and such interventions are not warranted given current conditions. If there is renewed
financial crisis, however, the foreign bond market should be the locus of intervention.
In these circumstances, Brazil might even consider a “bear squeeze,” buying large
quantities of Brazilian foreign debt. However, for Brazil to be able to do so, the IMF
will have to cooperate. Rather than lending in successive tranches, the IMF will have
to give Brazil the entire loan package in one shot to finance the repurchase of foreign
currency debt. This would drive bond prices up and interest rates down. Falling inter-
est rates would then strengthen the exchange rate by lowering default risk and mak-
ing Brazilian assets more attractive. And a stronger exchange rate would further
reduce the debt burden and default risk, making for lower interest rates. In this
fashion, a virtuous circle can be created. Such a strategy contrasts with that currently
employed, which has the IMF lending in small tranches. The current strategy risks
having loans bleed away without fundamentally changing market expectations.
Finally, all new foreign currency denominated debt, including roll-overs of exist-
ing debt, should include a call feature allowing for early redemption. This would send
another clear signal that the authorities anticipate the interest rate Brazil pays com-
ing down.
In addition to these changes in the conduct of international financial policy, Brazil
should make several changes to the management of its domestic market debt. First,
the monetary authority should create a bear squeeze in domestic bond markets, buy-
ing up non-dollar-indexed domestic currency denominated debt. If worried about adverse
inflationary consequences of such open market operations, the authorities should
impose credit creation restrictions and raise reserve requirements on banks who have
earned significant excess returns for a considerable while.418 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
Second, Brazil should permanently abandon the practice of indexing any part of its
public debt to the exchange rate. This practice has some parallels with dollarization
and, as with dollarization, it has created enormous financial fragility. In the absence
of capital controls, Brazil cannot reliably control its exchange rate. This means that
exchange rate indexing makes the public debt vulnerable to massive increase in the
event that the exchange rate depreciates, as has happened. Debt expansion in turn
creates twin fears of default and inflation, leading to further exchange rate weakness.
Put bluntly, Brazil cannot issue dollars, and it should therefore never tie its internal
financial liability structure to the dollar.
CONCLUSION
Brazil is currently afflicted by a high interest rate bad equilibrium. If nothing is
done, simple extrapolation suggests that Brazil will eventually be forced to default
because the debt dynamics implied by current interest rates are unsustainable. The
above policy suggestions offer a possible avenue for avoiding default. Much else remains
to be done in Brazil regarding matters of income distribution and the efficacy of Brazil’s
internal financial system. These are issues for another paper. However, it will be hard
to make progress on these issues until Brazil escapes the shadow of imminent finan-
cial default. George Soros’ analysis of financial markets and Brazil’s financial predica-
ment are suggestive of how Brazil might escape its current high interest rate trap.
More broadly, Soros’ analysis of financial markets suggests a need for policy makers
to reconsider how these markets operate, which may in turn result in rethinking the
role and relevance of capital controls.
NOTES
This paper was originally prepared for a conference on “Reforming the Reforms,” Brazil Center for
Policy Studies, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 29 November 2002. The views expressed in this paper are
those of the author, and not those of George Soros or the Open Society Institute.
1. His views on reflexivity are further developed and restated in his later books, On Globalization
[2002] and The Crisis of Global Capitalism: Open Society Endangered  [1998].
2. The field of behavioral finance, pioneered by economists such as Robert Shiller of Yale, suggests
the possibility of some convergence with Soros’ thinking. Some pieces of behavioral finance are
consistent with Soros’ thinking, others are not. For instance, the noise trade literature has super-
ficial resemblances, but is in fact inconsistent because it retains the notion of a “fundamentals
asset price” benchmark. The same holds for rational expectations price bubbles theory, which also
retains a market fundamentals benchmark that provides a reference point for measuring the
extent of the price bubble.
3. Soros’ observations on the morality of markets are well stated in his New Republic [2002b] article.
4. These disruptive extremes can include excessive concentrations of income, wealth, and power;
disregard for comprehensive social inclusion; and disregard for public goods and public bads.
5. The intimidation takes the form of a “capital strike.” The implication is that if the candidate disliked
by capital markets wins, capital will exit with grave consequences for the economy. Ergo, voters
should vote for the candidate whom capital markets like.
6. Whether Argentina pursued “fiscally responsible” policies has been the subject of considerable
discussion. In this connection, the share of GDP devoted to government expenditure remained
fixed from 1994 through to the crisis of 2001. Argentina was plagued by high interest rates,
however, which raised the debt service burden—the same problem that afflicts Brazil. It also419 SOROS ON INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS
privatized its PAYG pension system. Absent that change, Argentina would have had a balanced
budget in 2001.
7. Debt figures are based on “Brazil—Letter of Intent: Memorandum of Economic and Financial
Policies, and Technical Memorandum of Understanding,” 5 June 2002, signed with the IMF.
Available at http://www.imf.org/external/NP/LOI/2002/bra/02index.htm).
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